(DRAFT) There are arguments that the U.S. army has been targeting poorer, uneducated, and minority solders for military service. If this is true, within the context of the past operations in Iraq and current operations in Afghanistan, then the generating force (recruiting) within the army is at best acting in an unethical manner and at worst being criminal. Targeting the poor and minorities within the United States because they are easy to convince that military life is better than their civilian lives is unethical and disingenuous, especially if the purpose is to fill the combat ranks with such recruits. If the recruiting force is targeting the uneducated by design because they are easy and there is little competition, then the force is acting criminally. Putting people who are less capable, harder to train, and less able to understand the growing complexities of today’s battlefield into the army during a time of war, by design, places entire military formations and tactical, operational, and strategic success at risk. However, contrary to the growing cries of concern, there is really no evidence to suggest this is the case. Indeed, much of this debate centers on misunderstanding of the data, a lack of perspective, and a genuine concern of the perceived aggrieved groups. The last should be commended, the second can be forgiven, but the first is unacceptable.

While it is possible to conduct a review of the literature that details the often ranting and unsupported statements, this review would offer only a straw man that would be easily countered. Instead I will respond the most well laid out and communicated defense of the thesis that the army targets the poor and uneducated, either by design or by chance.

The first problem with the assessment that the army targets the uneducated and poor is the data. One assertion measures the level of education in the military by the quality of social media posts, General’s on television and the fact that U.S. army Soldiers voted for former President Bush over his opponent at a 4 to 1 ratio. I will accept that these observations are true, even though there is rarely a reference to support the claim. The relevancy of voting behavior is tied to observations that 50% of democratic voters have a bachelor’s degree or higher while republican voters have a lower rate of degrees. However, I cannot accept the interpretation of the National Priorities Project study that Mr. Rall cites in his analysis “Poor and Uneducated Like We Thought: Debunking The Military Debunkers”[1].

First, the assertion that the National Priorities Project study says “Young men and women from affluent neighborhoods--those with average household incomes of $100,000 or more--are three to four times less likely as those from poor and lower middle class areas (under $50,000) to serve in the military. This ratio is increasing.”, as stated by Mr. Rall is incorrect. The National Priorities Project Study[2] shows a general decline in recruitment of the lower 40% of the income range as determined by zip code income, as a percentage of overall recruitments. Generally, the evidence is a growing proportion of the U.S. army recruits coming from the middle class. Growth in recruit numbers has come from the 50-70% (middle to upper 30%) income range. Smaller proportional increases were experienced in recruitment from the upper 20% income ranges. However, the proportion of enlistments from the poor deciles is roughly the same as the proportion of enlistments from the rich deciles. Differentiation does not occur until the 5^th and 7^th deciles, where the proportions of enlistments are consistently higher in the higher deciles. And this only deals with enlisted Soldiers. Only 11% of the officer corps comes from the lower 20% of neighborhood income areas while 25% come from the highest 20% income neighborhood. Unfortunately, the 11% and the 20% figures come from the Heritage Foundation[3] study that Mr. Rall discredits.

The assertion that, “Many recruits are college dropouts who list their last address--their college dorm--when they sign up. College ZIP codes, populated by disproportionately high numbers of 18-to-24-year-olds who are full-time students and/or work low-paying and part-time jobs.”, is one that I cannot find references to support. I am not saying the evidence does not exist, just that I cannot find any such reference. In order for this dynamic to be true, two assumptions would have to be validated. First, the proportion of the 80,000 annual enlistments in the category of college dropouts would have to be significant. Second, zip codes the colleges were resident would have to have a lower income level than the rest of the nation, on average. I find either assumption to be intuitively difficult to support. However, I am unsure where to go to find any evidence, for or against the assertion.

Mr Rall’s statement, “there's a reason so many of the dead come from high-unemployment, low-wage states like West Virginia. They're desperate. And desperate people are more tempted to accept a job that could cost them their lives.”

Aside from being inflammatory, really has limited basis in facts. Indeed, evaluating the by-state casualty figures[4] against the state income rankings[5] demonstrates only a week correlation (See figure 2). The analysis shows that the trend line related to state income only explains around 13% of why a state would suffer the number of casualties it has in the war on terror. This is pretty strong evidence that there is not a significantly higher proportion of dead from poor states. Indeed West Virginia represents the 49^th state in income but only the 37^th state in terms of casualties. New Hampshire stands in stark contrast at 7^th in state income ranking and 45^th in war dead per 100,000 populations. It is essential that when making statements about where, who, and why people suffer that the correct metric is used. West Virginia has suffered roughly 19.71 war casualties per 100,000 of its population. New Hampshire has suffered roughly 23.04 war casualties per 100,000 of its population. Main and Vermont have suffered 25.89 and 26.98 war casualties per 100,000 of their populations but no one is seriously going to make the argument that the wealthy liberal northeast is suffering disproportionate casualties in the war on terror. This is even truer when you look at where recruits come from as in figure 3.

Less damaging, but much easier to dispute is Mr. Rall’s statement that “The non-partisan Congressional Budget Office's "1999 Survey of Active Duty Personnel" (the last year for which such data is available) found that "about 60 percent of enlisted personnel surveyed...reported having no more than a high school-level education when they began their military service." (Heritage jacks up the total to 83 percent by including GEDs.) 90 percent of employed Americans over age 25 have a high school diploma.”

These statements cannot be argued against. Indeed, 90% of employed Americans over age 25 have a high school diploma. However, if we look at the proportion of employed, then we can say that 100% of army personnel have at least a high school diploma or equivalent. The difference is in higher education proportions. Only around 35% of employed people in the U.S. have a bachelors or higher[6]. Each year the army newly enlists around 80,000 personnel and last year over 11,000 of them had bachelor degrees. Each year the army accesses around 5,300 officers into the army and ALL (100%) of them have at least bachelor degrees. Roughly 40% of the 500,000+ Soldiers in the U.S. Army[7] are officers. This means that AT least half of the entire active army has at least a bachelor degree. Roughly 15% of the enlisted force and 100% of the officer force will have degrees. This equates to at least 55% of the active army, without taking into account the education benefits available to enlisted soldiers AFTER they enlist. However, it is appropriate to point out that with deployment rates as high as they have been; it’s unlikely that a significant portion of the operational force (those who fight versus those who train and recruit the fighters) have been able to pursue higher education on active duty during the last four years.

Another of Mr. Rall’s inflammatory assertions is that

“You're more than 35 percent more likely to be in the military if you're black than if you're white. But you're 35 percent less likely to become an officer. Ignore the propaganda--the military is a reflection of, rather than a cure for, racism.”

Here I have to talk in relation to my personal experience, anecdotal evidence, and research conducted by the U.S. Army Accessions Command while I was affiliated with the command. In the last years the army has recognized that it has a disproportionate number of black enlisted Soldiers and under-represents blacks in the officer corps. The issue though is not a reflection of racism. It is a consequence of institutional racism in our society. Blacks as a proportion of the population are much more likely to not qualify for military enlistment because of education and criminal background issues. The Army has actually shifted resources away from recruiting blacks and to recruiting other minorities so that the army enlisted ranks will be more representative of the country. The trend was that blacks would join the army, but not as combat arms Soldiers, but as service support soldiers in order to learn a skill. There are many more support soldiers than combat arms soldiers, resulting in an over-representation of blacks. In 1999 61% of black officers[8] were in non-combat arms branches[9]. Throughout the Global War on Terrorism the percent of enlistments that are African-American has been falling[10].

Additionally, the atmosphere of acceptance and color-blindness that exists in most army organizations should work to keep blacks in the army at a higher rate than other ethnic groups. This is what Mr. Rall is talking about when he acknowledges that blacks retain at a higher rate than whites in his essay. The issue with black officers may have more to do with the small number of blacks graduating from undergraduate degree granting institutions as well as those graduate’s decisions to take their education back to their communities rather than join the military.

The veiled criticism that the U.S. army is retaining poor leadership is apparent in his statement, “In 2005 the Army promoted 97 percent of all eligible captains to major, an increase from the prewar norm of 70-to-80 percent. A Department official told The Los Angeles Times: "Basically, if you haven't been court-martialed, you're going to be promoted to major." This fact cannot and will not be denied. However, the high promotion rate is for a very good reason and starting in 2013 the promotion rate will begin falling back to the historical average.

First, the army had prepared and trained a number of captains (the rank before major) for an army that required a certain number of Majors, given a promotion rate of only about 70%. This would allow for a “culling” of the bottom 30% of a group that represents some of the highest trained and well educated leaders in the United States. However, the need to fight the campaigns of the Global War on Terror and innovations in command and control and organization of the land-fighting component of the army required MORE majors than even the available number of captains could support. It is a wonder, given the operational requirements that the army was facing that it would even allow 3% of its captains to not be promoted and be kicked out of the army. The 3% most likely represented those who were criminally unable to continue their careers. This promotion rate does not take into consideration the large number of captains that, having completed their active duty commitment, chose to take well paid jobs in the civilian sector rather than continue their army careers.

From the perspective of a field grade army officer, the last problem with the arguments about the army wanting to recruit or fill its ranks with uneducated people is an inadequate perspective. People who make these arguments do not think through the implications of such a policy on army command and control, discipline, training and tactical and operational risks. The U.S. army depends on high technology, computers, digital understanding, and abilities to master communications[11] and data sharing in a digital battlefield[12]. The U.S. army prefers to guide, develop, and provide mission orders rather than prescriptive orders and direct control[13]. Finally, the army is divided into two “forces” and each force has, on average, attracted different groups with different objectives.

The number, types, and pervasiveness of technological systems used in the army today require a base of knowledge, comfort with technology, and some exposure to digital technology for even the lowest enlisted Soldiers to succeed. Experience and comfort with digital high technology is not synonymous with poverty or lack of education. The army maintains 11 digital high technology systems just to maintain command and control of units on the battlefield[14]. This does not include all the unmanned systems, radios, major systems components, and computer programs that even enlisted infantry Soldiers must be proficient in using. The last thing that the army wants is people that take large amount of resources to train and prepare for introduction to these technologies. The army wants to recruit a Soldier, spend a few hours introducing them to technology, and then depend on the Soldier’s intuition and experience with high technology to enable individual and group learning. This is the army’s training philosophy; tell them what they will be trained, show them (hands on), and tell them what you told them.

Command and control (Mission Command) is not easy if those you are leading are incapable of understanding intent, lack initiative, have learning issues, cannot reason, or has a bias against education, learning, or self development. The assumption I am making is that for a person to be considered uneducated in the 21^st century they must lack these attributes. However, the basis of Mr. Rall’s assertion that the uneducated are targeted by recruiters is based on those with high school diplomas and is critical of including GEDs as “educated”. However, the initiative, dedication, and ethical core demonstrated by individuals who complete their GEDs are just the values that the army cherishes in its enlisted ranks. So, to discount these enlistments or to count them as uneducated is not only disingenuous but a disparagement of these hard working self developers.

I have no doubt that supporters of these arguments have a sincere desire to see these groups not exploited for unethical or immoral purposes. I would also never stoop to question the debaters on their possible exploitation of these groups to attack the U.S. defense establishment. I truly believe that the argument is based on an assessment of American institutional racism, minorities suffering disproportionately from poverty and poor education systems, and a series of historical examples of U.S. army exploitation and discrimination against groups. However, the evidence suggests that the U.S. army is making great strides, and wants to go further, to ensure that the Army’s diversity mirrors that of the nation. Indeed, the army wants to be viewed as “America’s Army[15]” and reflect the cultural diversity of the nation in both the enlisted and officer ranks. The Army views diversity as one of its core strengths as well as a driver for innovation, problem solving, and understanding[16].

There are arguments that the U.S. army has been targeting poorer, uneducated, and minority solders for military service. While I have no direct evidence that contradicts this, the indirect evidence does not support these arguments. Much of this debate centers on misunderstanding of the data, a lack of perspective, and a genuine concern of the perceived aggrieved groups. The strongest arguments for, and defense of, this argument misreports study findings and leaves out contrary data. The arguments lack a perspective that allows for an honest critique of the army’s efforts at establishing itself as representative of the nation’s diversity. Finally, while probably based in a strong ethical core, they come across feeling condescending and perhaps even a tone reflecting a small sense of racial superiority. The army, the command’s tasked with recruiting enlisted and accessing officers, and army officers and non-commissioned officers realize that diversity is essential for mission success. We as an army fight to ensure diverse, highly educated, and high quality human capitol. After all, the army is ALL ABOUT PEOPLE. The navy is about ships, the air force is about planes, but the army lives and dies based on the quality of its people.